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The defendants-appellees Prodata, Inc. ("Prodata") and
Will McCoy ("McCoy"), through counsel, submit this brief in
reply to the Brief of Appellee ("Appellee's Brief") submitted by
the plaintiff-appellee John P. Pratt ("Pratt").
REPLY TO APPELLEE' S STATEMENT QF CASE
Pratt and McCoy offer the following observations
regarding the Statement of the Case set forth in Appellee' s
Brief:
1.

Allegations of Falsehood—In his exposition of

the allegations on which this action is based at pages 3 and 4
of Appellee' s Brief, Pratt fails to note that his First Cause of
Action, the sole claim that went to the jury, specifically
alleged that "Defendants have made false and deceptive
representations" and that these "representations made by
Defendants were false, and defendants knew or should have known
(R. 2-13 at paragraphs 25 and 29. )J

of such falsity. . . . "
2.

Issues Preserved from the Trial--At footnote 3 of

Appellee's Brief, page 5, Pratt seems to suggest that issues
remain in this action with respect to the correctness of the
trial court' s instructions to the jury on the element of
improper means under Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657
P. 2d 293 (Utah 1982).

However, the record does not reflect any

cross-appeal with respect to the trial court's handling of these
*The references to
Brief follow the format
Brief at p. 4, fn. 1.
attachments to the Brief

the record and exhibits in this Reply
previously adopted in the Appellants'
References to the Addendum are to the
of Appellants dated August 26, 1991.
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issues.

As a consequence, under the most basic principles of

appellate practice, these points are no longer issues in this
action and the trial court' s ruling is law of the case.

See,

e. g. , Tracv v. University of Utah Hospital. 619 P. 2d 340, 342
(Utah 1980); Detonics ".45" Associates v. Bank of California. 97
Wash. 2d 351, 644 P. 2d 1170, 1172 (1982) (M [sjince plaintiffs did
not appeal the finding by the trial court . . . , this becomes
the law of the case").
3.

The Act of Interference—Pratt' s five-page

Statement of the Facts at pages 6 through 10 of Appellee' s Brief
is most telling in its almost entire neglect of the central
event of the case—the moment of interference by Prodata and
McCoy.

This crucial contact is summarized on page 9 in the

single phrase: "McCoy met with UDOT officials on several
occasions to discuss Hartle and Pratt. "

Clearly, where one

seeks to hold another liable for intentional interference with
economic relations through improper purpose, the nature of the
actual interference is of more than passing interest.

The

evidence at trial showed, at most, three meetings between UDOT
and McCoy—one merely a meeting to set up a meeting and another
occurring after the decisions to terminate Pratt had been made.
(T. 225-26, 355-56. )

Significantly, the meetings dealt with

both Hartle and Pratt; Pratt was not singled out.

To the

contrary, based on the most contemporary and neutral account,
Pratt was incidental to the discussion.

-3-

(Addendum 3. )

ARGUMENT
I,

THE JURY' S FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS SPOKE
TRUTHFULLY PRECLUDES THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR
INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
Pratt offers three reasons why the defendants'

transmission of truthful information, as the jury found, was
actionable.

None of these reasons is sufficient to prevent

entry of judgment in favor of Prodata and McCoy.
A.

Truth Is Not A "New Affirmative Defense."

Pratt's characterization of truth as a "new
affirmative defense" overlooks the record in this action.

As

noted above, Pratt himself put the truth of the defendants'
statements in issue with the filing of his Complaint.

In other

words, relying solely on the transmission of information for the
alleged interference, Pratt undertook the burden of proving in
the first instance that the offending words were false.

The

defendants denied this allegation and thus put Pratt to his
proof.

(R. 90-104 at paragraphs 25 and 29. ) This procedure

comports with the highly analogous area of defamation in which
the plaintiff would have the burden of proving the falsity of
the statement as a predicate to recovery.

See Philadelphia

Newspapers. Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986); Caruso
v. Local Union No. 690, 107 Wash. 2d 524, 730 P. 2d 1299. 1302
(1987) ("as a private defamation plaintiff, [one] has the burden
of proving falsity").

-4-

B.

The Jury Made the Requisite Finding.

Pratt insists that the jury's finding at Special
Verdict 3(a) does not suffice to establish that McCoy
transmitted truthful information to UDOT.

The jury was asked:

"Did the defendants make a false statement about a presently
existing fact to the Utah Department of Transportation?"
this, the jury responded: "No."

(R. 701.)

To

Inasmuch as Pratt

relied solely on the transmission of information in alleging
wrongful interference, the finding that no falsehood was
communicated to UDOT is the same as finding that any alleged
interference involved only truthful information.

Further, Pratt

offers no authority for the apparent suggestion that the
application of a clear and convincing standard renders the
jury' s finding inapposite.

As already noted, in the absence of

a cross-appeal, Pratt' s problems with the trial court' s
instructions to the jury are not properly before this Court on
appeal.
C.

Consistency and Sound Policy Dictate that
Truthful Information Not Be an Acceptable Basis
for a Claim of Wrongful Interference with
EgQnpmic Rglrtipns.

Pratt argues, without citation to authority, that the
issue of truth is relevant only to a consideration of the
improper means alternative under the Leigh Furniture test for
wrongful interference with economic relations.

Admittedly,

there is no authority explaining how Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 772(a) (1979) relates to application of the Oregon
-5-

definition of the tort of wrongful interference adopted by this
Court in Leigh Furniture.

However, the Wisconsin and Wyoming

authorities cited in Appellants' Brief at pages 14 and 15
clearly undermine the conclusion urged by Pratt that an improper
purpose can make truth telling, absent more, an adequate basis
for a finding of wrongful interference.
In the end, the issue is one of consistency and public
policy.

The transmission of truthful information is not only a

proper means--it is a constitutional right.
the law of defamation has already been noted.

The analogy with
(In fact, comment

b to Section 772 refers the reader to Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 581A (1977) which states: "One who publishes a
defamatory statement of fact is not subject to liability for
defamation if the statement is true. ")

Comment a to Section

581A notes that constitutional provisions making truthful
defamatory statements actionable if made for "malicious motives"
(the very result advocated by Pratt) have been held to violate
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

See,

e. g. , Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964);
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975);
Wright v. Southern Mono Hospital District, 631 F. Supp. 1294,
1326 (E.D. Cal. 1986) ("Truth of the statements made is a
complete defense against civil liability for defamation,
regardless of bad faith or malicious purpose" [emphasis added]).
Pratt should not be allowed to secure under the guise
of "wrongful interference" what he would be denied under the law
-6-

of defamation--money damages for the transmission of truthful
information.

Not only is such a result inconsistent, it runs

counter to the policies underlying the tort of wrongful
interference.

That tort seeks to balance two societal

interests--the interest in unfettered commercial activity and
the interest in being free from improper interference by others
in the pursuit of such activity.

When such a claim is based

solely on the transmission of information, a third interest of
constitutional proportions is implicated—the right to freely
speak the truth.

That interest is preeminent, particularly in

the functioning of our free enterprise system.

The flow of

truthful information, no matter how much that information hurts,
drives our financial markets, our consumer purchases, and our
corporate business decisions.
If the constitutional protection such information
receives can be overridden with a simple allegation of "improper
purpose," then more commercial entities than Prodata stand at
risk.

For instance, the stockbroker who recommends against the

purchase of a security based on accurate information known to
her must nonetheless answer to the jury for her motive when the
seller of the security alleges wrongful interference.
Similarly, the merchant who correctly notes the difference in
quality between his product and that of a competitor must still
face trial on the issue of improper purpose.

In the present

action, McCoy' s truthful statements regarding the covenant not
to compete have become the basis for a money judgment because of
-7-

the jury's assessment that they were made with an improper
purpose.

This result contradicts the basic expectation of the

marketplace that one is permitted to tell the truth without fear
of legal action.

It provides every disgruntled competitor with

an avenue to settle commercial scores under the heading of
wrongful interference.

This is bad policy for both the courts

and the free market.
II.

PRATT HAS FAILED TO POINT TO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
THAT WOULD SUPPORT A REASONABLE INFERENCE THAT, IN
CONTACTING UDOT, DEFENDANTS ACTED WITH A PREDOMINANT
PURPOSE TO HURT PRATT FOR THE SAKE OF INJURY ALONE.
Pratt was required to prove at trial that, on

September 28 and 29, 1989, McCoy spoke to UDOT regarding Pratt
with a "predominant purpose," not to further Prodata's economic
interests, but to hurt Pratt for "the sake of injury alone."
Leigh Furniture, supra, 657 P. 2d at 307-08.

In Appellee' s

Brief, Pratt cites no direct evidence of McCoy' s intent during
the relevant two-day period.

(In fact, all direct evidence--

from McCoy and from UDOT--indicates a pure economic motive. )
Pratt seeks to rely on "reasonable inferences" drawn from
"competent evidence,"

Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P. 2d 693, 695-96

(Utah 1982), but is ultimately forced to advance evidence that
would support the element of improper purpose, if at all, only
with an overwhelming measure of "surmise, speculation, or
conjecture."

Harsha v. State Savings Bank, 346 N. W. 2d 791, 800

(Iowa 1984) ("Circumstantial evidence must do more than raise a
suspicion; it must amount to proof").
-8-

A.

Pratt' s Manipulation of the Evidence.

The Brief of Appellants filed August 26, 1991 provides
the Court with the entire relevant testimony of Pratt' s
witnesses without editing, commentary or transposition. (In his
Appellee's Brief, Pratt has not cited to any significant
additional testimony. ) What Prodata and McCoy have cited to
this Court is what the jury actually heard and the record on
which the jury's verdict must rest.

In contrast, Pratt in

Appellee's Brief has offered this Court a mere commentary on the
evidence with only minimal quotations and essentially no
context.

QJL, Rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence: Monlux v.

General Motors Corp. , 714 P. 2d 930, 935 (Hawaii 1986).
Prodata and McCoy respond to the Appellee Brief s
characterization of the evidence on a witness-by-witness basis
as follows:
1.

Roger Claws on (Appellee's Brief, p.15)--Pratt

contends that McCoy was "very unhappy" (apparently quoting Roger
Clawson) with Pratt for "no legitimate business reason."
However, the actual testimony of Roger Clawson was as follows:
"[T]he subject of John Pratt came up and the gist of the
conversation was that Will was unhappv with John Pratt' s conduct
of terminating his contract and going to work directly for a
client."

(Addendum 10; emphasis added. ) As recounted by Mr.

Clawson, McCoy linked his unhappiness directly to Pratt' s
termination of his contract.

The jury could hardly believe

McCoy was "unhappy" and then disregard his further admission as
-9-

to the business reason for his unhappiness.

Certainly there was

nothing in this exchange to provide even circumstantial evidence
of a purpose six months later to hurt Pratt for the sole sake of
inflicting pain.
B.

Glen Read (Appellee's Brief, p. 15)--Pratt

contends that McCoy had no business reason for telling Mr. Read
to "stay away" from Pratt.

In fact, Mr. Read testifies that

McCoy told him "not [to] have any dealings with Mr. Pratt
because he believed that he was a bad influence. . . . "
According to Mr. Read, McCoy accused Pratt of doing "several
things that were professional unethical" and "that he had done
things that were far worse than anything I knew about."

Mr.

Read then admitted that he himself was aware of conduct on the
part of Pratt that he deemed to be "inappropriate."

(Addendum

11. ) That conduct, as disclosed by Mr. Read, was indisputably
business related.
For his part, McCoy freely admitted that he directed
Prodata employees (including presumably Mr. Read) to stay away
from Pratt:
Q.

You don' t remember any instances of telling
anyone to stay away from John Pratt?

A.

I have done that, but I explained why.

Q.

Why was that?

A.

Because when Mr. Pratt left the subcontract
arrangement in March of 1989, to me he appeared
to be very bitter, he had some negative words
about our company, and I asked our employees that
it would be best if they stayed away from him
-10-

because his attitude was not the best and I told
them that he did not care for Pro-Star.
Q.

You' re not aware of anything bad that John
Pratt' s done or that you would consider bad, are
you?

A.

I'm not.

Q.

You never told anybody that John Pratt' s done
anything bad, have you?

A.

No, I have not.
(T. 169-70. )

Again, with this testimony and that of Mr. Read, Pratt
wants to modify, and then to cut and paste.

McCoy testified as

to the business purpose of his admonitions to stay away from
Pratt.

For his part, Mr. Read freely acknowledged a business

justification for the accusation of misconduct.

On the other

hand, McCoy denied knowing or saying anything bad about Pratt.
To concoct sufficient evidence, Pratt now asks this Court to
accept that the jury believed McCoy' s protestations of ignorance
of any wrongdoing, but disbelieved his denial in the same
breath that he made any accusations of wrongdoing.

Then, to

complete the scenario, Pratt contends that the jury must believe
Mr. Read' s testimony as to McCoy' s accusations, but disbelieve
Mr. Reid' s testimony regarding the business justification
arising from Pratt' s questionable conduct.
confusing and, in the end, unavailing.

It is all a bit

This mixing of the

evidence does not "raise a suspicion," much less "amount to
proof," that McCoy entertained malice toward Pratt that overrode
all other motivations when, nearly five months later, McCoy
-11-

approached UDOT regarding Pratt' s breach of the covenant not to
compete,
C.

Christopher Crocker (Appellee's Brief, pp. 15-16)-

-Pratt errs in citing Mr. Crocker for the proposition that
McCoy, in June, 1989, accused Pratt "of taking contracts away
from Prodata and violating his non-compete obligation to
Prodata. . . . "

Rather, in his testimony, Mr. Crocker was

careful to note that Pratt' s name was not mentioned:
A.

Okay. What I have to do is back up in time. Not
knowing at the time who John Pratt was and not
having his name mentioned, a statement at a
luncheon by Mr. McCoy and also backed up by Mr.
Basham was that contractors had taken contracts,
consequently, money away from Pro-Star, that they
had violated their no compete clause and Pro-Star
intended to make an example of them.
(Addendum 9, emphasis added. )

There is absolutely no evidence that McCoy was actually
referring to Pratt.
Even if McCoy were referring to Pratt and the jury
chose to believe Mr. Crocker' s testimony, all that is proven is
that McCoy did indeed have knowledge of Pratt' s breach of the
covenant not to compete at an earlier date than McCoy himself
acknowledged in his testimony.

It will not do to say that the

jury believed McCoy's professions of ignorance and then believed
that he manufactured the June, 1989 claim of breach to which Mr.
Crocker testified.

This certainly is not what Mr. Cocker

believed:
Q.

[Y]ou understood all along and throughout this
thing what was motivating those statements was
-12-

the fact that somebody at Pro-Star believed there
had been a violation of some noncompetition
clauses, right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And throughout the time as you observed those
individuals who were making these statements, Mr.
McCoy specifically, it was clear that he
sincerely believed that that was the case.

A.

That' s my belief.
(Addendum 9. )

On another point, McCoy' s apparent pleasure after
meeting with Pratt and Hartle (a meeting that neither Pratt nor
Hartle nor McCoy remembered) proves nothing regarding McCoy' s
state of mind in contacting UDOT.

Pratt offers no explanation

for how an open demonstration of pleasure in the advantage over
a competitor makes the fact that McCoy hated Pratt and wished
him harm for harm' s sake alone any more likely than a more
benign, competitive motive.
D.

Ronald Hartle (Appellee's Brief, p. 16)--Contrary

to Pratt' s assertion in Appellee' s Brief, Hartle testified that
Mr. Basham, and not McCoy, told Mr. Hartle that "he [Basham]
would take whatever means he could to get [Hartle] out of UDOT."
(Addendum 13.)

There is no principle of law that transforms Mr.

Basham' s statement into that of McCoy.

Further, Mr. Basham' s

statement as recited by Mr. Hartle is not one of intent, but a
representation as to the action Mr. Basham intended to take.

It

is mere speculation to read into the remarks a motive to hurt as
opposed to a purpose to protect Prodata' s long-term economic
-13-

interests.

And it approaches the realm of purest surmise to

conclude that any intent inferred was also directed at Pratt and
was shared by McCoy.

As with the examples previously cited,

Pratt strings such conjectures together like so many misfit
tinker toys resulting in a construction of the evidence that is
as unwieldy as it is absurd.
E.

Charl es Chri s t ens en (Appellee's Brief, p. 16)--

Prodata' s failure to first contact Pratt regarding his breach of
the covenant not to compete proves nothing with respect to
McCoy's purpose in contacting UDOT.

There is no principle of

law that requires a party to first contact the offending party
before alleging a breach of contract or be deemed to have acted
with malicious intent.

Charles Christensen most aptly and

conclusively recalled that McCoy described his dealings with
UDOT as a "business arrangement."

(Addendum 12. ) Such an

admission, if believed (as Pratt clearly feels it should be),
belies the notion that the defendants acted with any overriding
desire to hurt Pratt for the sake of injury alone rather than
with a "legitimate long-range economic motivation."
B.

The Evidence Will Not Support The Finding That
The Defendants Acted With An Improper Purpose.

To evaluate McCoy' s purpose in contacting UDOT, The
jury had to get inside of McCoy's mind.

This is a treacherous

inquiry even with the clearest of evidence.

This Court

recognized in Leigh Furniture "[the] [p]roblems inherent in
proving motivation or purpose. . . . "
-14-

657 P. 2d at 307.

Such

problems are legion on the record in this action.

Pratt has

failed to cite to any evidence on which the jury could have
based a finding that Prodata or McCoy entertained any desire to
injure Pratt "as an end in itself" or "for the sake of injury
alone. "

Leigh Furniture, 657 P. 2d at 307-08.

Even more remote

from the actual evidence before the jury is evidentiary support
for the essential proposition that such a malicious motive
predominated over all other motives.

Even Pratt' s

characterization of the evidence, which is neither the testimony
actually heard by the jury nor a fair reading of that testimony,
fails to meet the sufficiency of the evidence test.
III.

THE DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT WAS NOT THE LEGAL CAUSE OF
PRATT' S LOSS.
Pratt fails to meet the thrust of the defendants'

argument with respect to proximate cause.

At the outset, the

sole significance of the defendants' concession regarding cause
in fact is that the jury' s finding in this regard appears to be
supported by evidence sufficient under the applicable legal
standard and, therefore, not worth serving as the basis of an
appeal.

However, under Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction

Co. , 701 P. 2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985), that factual finding does
not end the inquiry as to proximate or legal cause.

This Court

must apply "considerations of common sense and policy" to
determine whether the acts of the defendants are the proximate
cause of Pratt' s loss.

McKellips v. Saint Francis Hospital,

Inc. , 741 P. 2d 467, 470 (Okl. 1987).
-15-

Pratt does not dispute his

clear testimony at trial that he utterly refused any settlement
with Prodata (the party in the right) that did not require a
complete capitulation on the part of Prodata.
broke off all negotiations with Prodata.

Pratt himself

Despite his clear

violation of a valid covenant not to compete and UDOT" s
unequivocal explanation of the long-term adverse consequences to
Pratt flowing from a failure to settle matters with Prodata,
Pratt accepted the inevitable loss of over $84,000 in contracts
with UDOT rather than pay a penny to Prodata.
In the final analysis, Pratt was the master of his own
destiny.

However improper Prodata' s purpose might be deemed,

the termination by UDOT could have been reversed through a
simple compromise.

Hartle did so and returned to work.

Pratt

elected to reject compromise and ended up in litigation seeking
damages arising directly from that refusal to settle.

The

policy of this Court should be that those who walk with eyes
open into a situation which will result in loss cannot blame
another for those losses.
the present action.

Common sense dictates this result in

Prodata should not bear the damages

resulting from Pratt' s free choices over which Prodata had
absolutely no control.
IV.

PRATT HAS OFFERED NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY' S
RESOLUTION OF THE COUNTERCLAIM.
Pratt has failed to cite this Court to any evidence on

which the jury could have based a finding that Pratt's breach of
the covenant not to compete did no harm to Prodata' s goodwill.
-16-

Pratt misses the point in contending that the project on which
he was working when he left Prodata suffered no harm and that he
continued to do his contract work for Prodata while secretly
working for UDOT in March and April, 1989.

As this Court has

repeatedly emphasized, the sole legitimate purpose for a
covenant not to compete is to protect an employer' s goodwill in
a valuable employee.

See System Concepts Inc. v. Dixon, 669

P. 2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983); Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P. 2d
823, 827 (Utah 1951).

Thus, the damages Pratt claims not to

have caused are unrelated to those to be avoided through
enforcement of the covenant not to compete.
The mere fact that Pratt knew one of the individuals
with whom he worked at UDOT for a period of time before Pratt
was employed with Prodata does nothing to disprove an injury to
Prodata' s goodwill.

At trial, Pratt acknowledged that it was

under the terms of the Employment Agreement containing the
covenant not to compete (Ex. 11) that he first went to work for
UDOT.

(T. 52. )

Further, the very UDOT employee who previously

knew Pratt reviewed Pratt' s employment contract with McCoy in
connection with a UDOT project.

(T. 322. ) In other words,

Pratt first entered UDOT and thereafter worked at UDOT under the
Prodata banner.

In that capacity, he engendered much goodwill

for Prodata as evidenced by UDOT' s willingness to hire him even
while he was still working on another project for Prodata.

The

covenant not to compete was tailored specifically to protect
that goodwill.

The liquidated damages clause enforcing that
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covenant was intended to constitute a reasonable estimate of
these most real but elusive damages.

Given the complete absence

of evidence in the record refuting the fact of an injury to
Prodata, the jury's finding as to the Counterclaim must be set
aside.
CONCLUSION
Pratt has failed to advance law or facts of record
that would support the resolution of this matter in the trial
court.

In contrast, the defendants have demonstrated that the

jury's findings and the trial court's application of the law are
without adequate basis.

This Court should reverse the Judgment

of the trial court and enter Judgment in favor of the defendants
on both the Complaint and the Counterclaim.
DATED this / '

day of November, 1991.

VAN C O T ^ BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Eric C. Olson
Attorneys for Defendants
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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